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Abstract 
In this chapter I propose a theoretical framework for understanding the role of 
mediation processes in the inculcation, maintenance, and change of evaluative meaning systems, 
or axiologies, and how such a perspective can provide a useful and complementary dimension 
to analysis for SFL and CDA. I argue that an understanding of mediation—the movement of 
meaning across time and space—is essential for the  analysis of meaning. Using two related 
texts as examples, I show how an understanding of mediation can aid SFL and CDA 
practitioners in the analysis of social change.  
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Predication, propagation, and mediation:  
SFL, CDA, and the inculcation of evaluative meaning systems 
Introduction: Medium, media, and mediation 
Much research has been done in CDA and SFL on media texts, which is to say texts in 
the media, or what is commonly termed media “content”. However, much of this work has been 
done without an explicit theory of media. The purpose of this chapter is to provide a theoretical 
framework for understanding the role mediation processes play in the inculcation, maintenance, 
and change of evaluative meaning systems, and how a mediation perspective can provide a 
useful and complementary dimension to analysis for SFL and CDA.  
I assume that the most significant commonalities, complementarities, and differences 
between CDA and SFL are addressed elsewhere in this volume. Also, while providing a brief 
outline here of what a ‘predication and propagation’ approach means, I refer the reader to 
Graham (2002a) for a fuller account of the analytical method and how it might be deployed. The 
most basic assumption I make in emphasising the evaluative dimension of meaning is that it is the 
prime dimension of meaning for motivating human action—within a given social milieu, I assume 
people will pursue that which is construed as being of most value, whether that be happiness, 
holiness, wealth, or whatever. There is ample evidence for such an assumption in psychology, 
anthropology, sociolinguistics, political economy, and many other fields of social science (cf. 
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Firth, 1951; Graham, 2001a, 2001b). Like Innis (1951) and McLuhan (1964) I also assume 
that new media forms disrupt and change evaluative meaning systems (hereafter axiologies) both 
within and between social systems.  
First I will define what I mean by the term “media”, and how technological changes in 
media environments figure as important social forces. In its most common contemporary sense, 
the term “media” refers to technological and institutional systems through which people produce, 
store, distribute, and “consume” symbolic material on a mass scale: television, radio, the press, 
internet, and so on. That view tends towards seeing media as technological forms. Another 
sense of the term refers to various media texts and text types: news stories, reality TV, action 
movies, editorials, etc. That view tends towards seeing media as forms of content. A third, less 
common view incorporates both these perspectives. It also accommodates a processual view of 
media and allows for multiple perspectives on media in terms of production, consumption, 
distribution, and transformation of meanings. That view is described by Silverstone (1999) as 
mediation.  
The term mediation includes the production, movement, and transformation of meanings 
within and between social contexts, across space and time. It is a perspective that sees ‘the 
movement of meaning from one text to another, from one discourse to another, from one event 
to another’ and ‘the constant transformation of meanings, both large scale and small, significant 
and insignificant’ in ‘in writing, in speech and audiovisual forms’ (Silverstone 1999: 13). It 
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includes technological, social, institutional, and content perspectives on media without 
confounding them.  
Technology, medium, genre, and mode 
The technological characteristics of specific mediation systems have effects on how 
meanings are moved, but not necessarily which meanings can get moved (whether at lexical, 
semantic, grammatical, or discoursal levels). Television, for instance, can just as easily be used 
to move pornographic meanings as it can to move evangelical ones. So can print and radio. In 
distinction to the concept of media, and more broadly, ‘technology is how we do things’ (White 
1940: 15). It is the technological character of a medium which makes, for example, political 
debates in print or on the radio appear to be entirely different forms of meaning than televised 
versions of the “same” debates. Put differently, seen from a technological perspective, there are 
hierarchies of media, genres, and modes expressed in whichever instance of meaning we may 
care to identify (see Figure 1). The particulars of these arrangements and hierarchies change 
when new technological forms are introduced into a media environment (Innis, 1951; McLuhan, 
1964). 
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Figure 1: Arrangement of medium, genres, and modes from a technological perspective.  
Despite the technological character of a medium exerting its most direct and apparent 
constraints upon the kinds of modes it will accommodate (for example, one can neither transmit 
photographs through the medium of radio nor soundwaves through print media), mode is a far 
more concrete analytical category than genre. A given medium will accommodate a theoretically 
infinite number of genres while accommodating a definite and finite number of modes. A given 
genre is constituted by multiple modes, and all meanings are multimodal. Genre, then, at least in 
the perspective presented in Figure 1, has technological, medialogical, and multimodal 
dimensions: genres are never formally independent of technologies or mediation processes, and 
Medium 
Genres 
Modes 
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so any account of genre must also include an account of its technological aspects, how it is 
mediated, and of the modes which typically constitute a given genre. Modes are the means by 
which genres are textured, or formed, whereas genres express historical inculcations of 
patterned interactions within and across cultures. Genres are patterns of interaction, not merely 
classes of artefacts. A genre, according to the latter view (as artefact),  
is a text-type specified by identifying a common structure of functional units (obligatory 
and optional) that is repeated again and again from text to text. … A genre has a 
constituency structure in which each constituent plays a functional role in the whole and 
has specific functional meaning relations to the other constituents on its own level. 
(Lemke, 1998b)  
The former view of genre—as patterned action—focuses on 
activity formations , the typical doings of a community which are repeatable, repeated, and 
recognized as being of the same type from one instance or occurrence to another. A 
baseball game, a train ride, writing a check, making a phone call. We could also call these 
action genres. Among the special cases of action genres are speech genres and written 
genres, but these are clearly also definable as the products of the activities that produce 
them. (Lemke, 1995, pp. 31-32) 
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The ‘action genre’ category that Lemke describes is clearly a more general one than the ‘text-
type’ view, since the latter forms part of the former and includes them as products and devices 
of patterned ‘doings’. In both accounts of genre, though, we see an explicit assumption of 
typological movements of meanings ‘from text to text’. Mediation processes are the means by 
which this happens. Modes are part of the constituency structure of any genre. Medium, in the 
view I am proposing here, works in a “downwards” way upon genre formations, constraining 
and delimiting the range of constituency elements which can comprise the features of a given 
genre by constraining the modes by which meanings can be made within any class of mediations. 
In fact, the movement of similar elements so that they form generic patterns—mediation itself—
is the essence of evaluative inculcation, and genres appear to be necessary functions of 
mediation.  
In so far as a genre ‘arouses expectations’ that people ‘never quite expect to see met’ 
(Lindenberger, 1990, p. xv); insofar as the primary function of genres is to elicit and solicit 
expectations (Graham, 2001a); and in so far as institutions are the sites of genre production, and 
of the source of expectations associated with those genres, we can assume that institutional 
axiologies necessarily pervade genres. It also follows that genres are closely linked to the irrealis 
life of social systems (Graham, 2001b). Because they are patterned ways of producing 
expectations, genres link social pasts with the present, and with possible futures. We can see, in 
our contemporary context, how certain genres such as those associated with the production of 
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news or policy or advertising, shape and delimit future potentials for social change by 
consistently producing and reproducing expectations about future courses of action.  
Given that there is much in the SFL and CDA literature about genres and modes, the 
addition of a mediation perspective may seem trivial or unnecessary, if not irrelevant. Yet CDA 
and SFL both place a great deal of emphasis on various notions of context. Included in these 
notions are such concepts as ‘heteroglossia’, various forms of ‘semogenesis’, ‘genealogy’, 
‘diachronic change’, ‘agnation’, ‘genre hybridity’, and ‘syntagmatic’ change (cf. Fairclough, 
1992; Halliday, 1978; Lemke, 1995; Luke, in press; Martin, 1999). All of these terms 
presuppose a theory of mediation, a theory of the historical movement and transformation of 
meanings across times and spaces.  
Halliday, for instance, is explicit about the historical character of the relationship 
between text and context. It is ‘a continuous process’, and there is ‘a constantly shifting 
relationship between the text and its environment, both paradigmatic and syntagmatic’ (Halliday, 
1978, p. 139). However, in both SFL and CDA, the entire class of context-related historical 
phenomena goes largely unexplained in terms of theory or analysis in respect of mediation—they 
are assumed as historical phenomena without any mediating infrastructure. People most certainly 
make, move, change, and conserve meanings over time, but the differences in how this happens, 
within and between social groups, has very important ramifications for the character of a group, 
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its modes and forms of knowledge, and its modes of relatedness (Innis, 1951; McLuhan, 1964; 
Postman, 1985).  
The primarily evaluative impacts that changes in the media environment have are 
functions of the technical biases of newly dominant media forms. The visual bias of print, for 
example, both appeals to and emphasises an entirely different realm of human experience than 
does the aural bias of radio—visual distinctions are of a very different order than aural ones 
(McLuhan, 1964). The social memory of a group that relies solely upon oral and aural media 
will have a very different suite of mnemonic devices and social strategies for conserving various 
meanings than one that relies, for instance, on writing, television, computer technologies, or 
various ratios of these. I contend that we cannot understand the character of meaning systems in 
social systems without understanding the totality of means by which societies store and move 
meanings.  
If we are to claim knowledge of a community’s heteroglossic inheritances, its 
semogenetic changes, changes in its generic forms, and so on, we need to understand precisely 
how systematic ways of apprehending and evaluating the world are inculcated within social 
systems. Inculcation is a function of mediation. Mediation processes are primarily evaluative 
because they are processes ‘of classification: the making of distinctions and judgements’; they 
are the means by which valued meanings are carried over historically and propagated, and by 
which other meanings are devalued and “filtered out”. That is because mediations are ‘central to 
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this process of making distinctions and judgements’ and, ‘in so far as they do, precisely, mediate 
the dialectic between the classification that shapes experience and the experience which colours 
classification, then we must enquire into the consequences of such mediation. We must study the 
media’  (Silverstone, 1999, p. 12). Silverstone’s is an important exhortation for CDA and SFL, 
especially at a time when cultural, political, and economic activities have merged in an almost 
seamless manner within globally interconnected systems of mediation. In fact what is currently 
called the “global” context could not exist without its systems of mediation (Silverstone, 1999, 
p. 144). 
A brief note on predication and propagation 
The approach to axiological analysis I have called ‘predication and propagation’ is a 
synthesis of Martin’s (2000) work on ‘appraisal’ and Lemke’s (1998a) work on attitudinal 
meaning (see Graham, 2001b, 2002a). The main difference between analysing the axiological 
aspect of meaning from predication and propagation perspectives is firstly the level of 
abstraction at which analyses are conducted. Lexical resources deployed in evaluative 
predication inscribe or attribute an element of the text with particular attributes. From the 
perspective of ‘evaluative propagation’, we are interested in seeing axiologies that propagate 
across the whole course of a text and beyond (Lemke, 1998, pp. 49-53). Beyond specific acts 
of meaning, which I understand merely as instances of social dynamics, we can see that 
axiologies give coherence to practically every act of meaning making, both large-scale and 
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small, and that these axiologies are inculcated—repeated, and by means of repetition, to some 
degree imposed, to some degree changed—over long periods of time. That includes the 
neoliberal axiology that underpins most (if not all) currently dominant political and economic 
thought. It is a function of repetition, a process of ‘permanent, insidious imposition, which 
produces, through impregnation, a real belief’ (Bourdieu, 1998, p. 29).  
Implications for analysis 
The following two related texts are useful for seeing the implications of a mediation 
perspective for the analysis of axiologies in SFL and CDA. I leave aside an analytical focus on 
predication and propagation to focus specifically on the medialogical relations expressed in the 
two texts. 
[1] Well, there has been some real news this week. The DNC 1 announced it will hold the 
2000 Democratic Convention in Los Angeles. But what you may not know is that the Los 
Angeles Planning Committee insisted on some minor changes in the convention format. 
For example, the Democratic candidate must start his acceptance speech by thanking the 
Academy, and saying what an honor it is just to be nominated. (Laughter.) In addition to 
the red-meat rhetoric as usual, there will be a fabulous vegetarian plate prepared by 
Wolfgang Puck. Tough questions will now be handled by stunt doubles. There'll be a 
fundraiser at Grauman's Chinese Theater. And, basically – even after it's over – in 
Hollywood, Oscars will still be bigger than the convention. (Clinton 1999a) 
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[2] So with the value of humor so great, it's no wonder that occupants of the Oval Office 
have added "humor consultants" to their arsenal of experts. The modern collection of wise 
men and wise women has been expanded to include a wise-ass.  
Personally, I think it's only fair that the political world has raided the world of humor. 
Because America's opinion of its President is shaped more by the one-liners crafted for 
late-night comics than through the press releases issued by staffers. Which explains why 
most politicians have come to fear laughter; more often than not, it comes at their 
expense.  
My job is to remind them that humor can be their friend. The trick is not just to steal the 
format but co-opt the target as well. (Katz, 2000) 
Text [1] is an annual address to the United States Radio and Television Correspondents 
Association annual dinner by former US President Clinton. Text [2] is a lecture to a University 
President’s Forum by Mark Katz, the person who wrote text [1], and numerous other 
humorous scripts for Clinton.  
To understand these two texts from a mediation perspective, we need to see the 
institutional relationships established and expressed within and between them. Clinton’s address 
comes immediately after he was acquitted in his impeachment over events surrounding his affair 
with Monica Lewinsky. His audience is the same group of journalists who pursued him for a full 
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year in public in a most humiliating manner. Katz’s address is for an audience of academics. His 
purpose is to explain the role comedy has come to play in politics. 
In text [1], Clinton actively blurs the borders between the institutions of entertainment 
and politics by identifying their functional convergence and changes in their relative political 
importance. The institutions, conventions, and genres of the Hollywood movie industry are, 
Clinton jokes, to be appropriated by the Democratic National Convention (DNC). Humour 
derives from Clinton’s implicit admission that politics is, in effect, little more than genre-scripted 
performance [the Democratic candidate must start his acceptance speech by thanking the 
Academy, and saying what an honor it is just to be nominated]. The red-meat rhetoric of power 
politics converges with the fashionably fabulous vegetarian plate served by celebrity fast-food 
magnate, Wolfgang Puck. Clinton compares the political danger of interacting with his audience 
when they are being journalists [asking tough questions] with the perils of an action movie stunt 
double. But regardless of how closely the political machinations of the DNC align with the 
institutions of mass-mediated culture, the genres of entertainment have the upper hand. So, at 
least in Hollywood, Oscars will still be bigger than the convention. Clinton deploys humour to 
exercise and negotiate institutional relations of power between entertainment and power politics. 
The Oscars may remain impervious to partisan appropriations of Hollywood award genres, but 
the US President is still the Commander-in-Chief of the world’s most powerful army. In text [1] 
Clinton acknowledges a symbiosis of power—a barely implicit statement of the power-sharing 
  15 
“deal”—between the institutions of mass entertainment and mass governance, and the 
movement of genres between these domains.  
In text [2], Katz provides a framework for understanding how such a speech can be 
made at all. The institutions of humour have been moved from the lowest ranks in the ‘hierarchy 
of genres’ (Bakhtin 1936/1984, p. 65) to having immense political value and power. The value 
of humor is now so great, says Katz, that a US President’s arsenal must now include humor 
consultants. Here, Katz articulates the historical conflation of military, academic, management, 
entertainment, and political domains. Humour consultants have become necessary in politics 
because one-liners crafted for late-night comics are a more powerful political force than official 
statements issued by staffers. Katz identifies two formerly distinct evaluative domains, or social 
“worlds”—the political world and the world of humor—claiming the latter has recently been 
raided by the former for its increased value and power. At the functional level of mediation, we 
can see that the motives for moving meanings between military, academic, management, 
entertainment, and political institutions have overtly axiological underpinnings. The Presidential 
machine has raided humour on the basis of its perceived ‘symbolic value’ in respect of creating 
public value for political figures (Bourdieu, 1991). To conduct a successful raid upon the world 
of humor, Katz understands that a raid of comedy genres and techniques is necessary but 
insufficient. Success requires not only the appropriation of the format; the target of political 
satire (in this case, the President’s integrity) must also be coopted. Katz describes an 
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institutional occupation of an entire media space, including its key participants, processes, and 
circumstances. 
 He is quite explicit on this point, as well as its historical, political, and social significance:  
[2a] It was under the license of humor that for eight years I was granted the immunity to 
walk into the White House and tell the man widely acknowledged as the most powerful 
person on earth a bunch of jokes with punchlines premised upon his faults and foul-ups.  
To his face, I told the kind of jokes most often spread behind backs. Then I 
recommended he say them himself, out loud, in front of the entire Washington 
establishment and the White House press corps. It's how I came to find myself standing 
in the Oval Office, surrounded by high-level aides, looking directly in the eyes of the 
leader of the free world and listening to myself say: “Mr. President, I urge you to make 
the ‘cheeseburger’ joke.” (Katz, 2000) 
The strategic value of humour and Presidential self-denigration draws attention to a substantial 
shift in public values, one which is directly premised upon the kinds of media environments in 
which contemporary politics are done, and hence upon the axiologies peculiar to that 
environment. The most powerful person on earth gains political value by being able to 
successfully perform political satire with the primary target of his jokes being his own faults and 
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foul-ups. In other words, what would be a political expense for Clinton in the hands of another 
comedian becomes a strategic value because of his own skill as a comedian.  
Clinton’s understanding of this recapitalising process is evidenced in the opening lines of 
his address:  
[1a] I want to thank you for your invitation to come have dinner with 2,000 members of 
the Washington press corps. Amazingly enough, I accepted. If this isn't contrition, I 
don't know what is. 
I know you can't really laugh about this. I mean, the events of the last year have been 
quite serious. If the Senate vote had gone the other way, I wouldn't be here. 
I demand a recount. 
To reiterate: this is one of Clinton’s first public appearances after being acquitted in an 
impeachment hearing. In five short sentences, Clinton deploys humour to increase his political 
capital amongst a hostile press corps by recapitalising a process that might well have produced 
his political demise, if not a jail term. After saying how amazing it is that he accepted the 
invitation, Clinton apologises for the events of the past year [his appearance is an act of 
contrition]; notes how serious the process of impeachment has been; that it is not funny [you 
can't really laugh about this]; then he turns a humorous blowtorch upon himself and 2000 
  18 
Washington reporters by saying I demand a recount. The basis for humour here is that had his 
impeachment had been successful, he would not have to perform his act of contrition in front of 
the people who were largely responsible for one of the most intimately personal, sustained, and 
thoroughly aired assaults on a US President in history.  
Katz describes the historical significance of the I demand a recount joke:  
[2b] Even today, I find that joke absolutely breathtaking in its courage—audacity 
really—and in the incredible set of circumstances that made it relevant in the first place. 
I don't think you'll find another joke like it in the annals of presidential history and I hope 
you never will. This past month marked the swansong humor season of the Clinton 
administration and while we lacked the compelling backdrop of impeachment, we 
managed to find a few topics that proved fruitful.  
The role mediation plays in institutional change becomes quite overt when Katz bemoans the 
loss of the compelling backdrop of impeachment.  
 Rather than seeing the impeachment process as a political liability, Katz recognises its 
potential for generating political value in the form of humour. By deploying the theatrical 
terminology of backdrop to describe an enabling circumstance for historically unique humour, 
Katz indicates that the field of Presidential politics, even at its most serious, has self-consciously 
shifted itself to the centre of the entertainment field—the stage. The audience’s expected 
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engagement—a prerequisite for humour—derives from the seriousness of the circumstances in 
which Clinton found himself. That seriousness also performs an amplifying function for the 
audience—not just the audience Clinton is addressing, but the global audience for the 
impeachment process, with all its relatively sordid details. The engagement resources Katz 
leverages are cultural expectations about the potential outcomes of an impeachment. The whole 
situation is amplified by its world-wide propagation along the lines of entertainment values, the 
situation literally intensifying as the size of the impeachment audience grows. Clinton’s 
impeachment, after being appropriated by humorists, becomes a medium, a technology, and a 
macro-circumstance—quite literally, a theatrical backdrop against which humour can 
successfully be performed. Moved from the sphere of politics to the sphere of entertainment, 
impeachment thus becomes a situation for situation comedy.  
Institutional values, genre hybridity, and inculcation 
While power politics adapts itself to the generic values of sitcom, global media 
corporations are adjusting themselves to the power bestowed upon them by the political 
“sanctification” of their generic forms. Gerald Levin, Time-Warner CEO and co-architect of the 
world’s largest media merger (with America On Line), is clearly aware of shifting generic, 
institutional, and functional boundaries between power politics and mass media institutions:  
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We're going to need to have these corporations redefined as instruments of public 
service because they have the resources, they have the reach, they have the skill base, 
and maybe there's a new generation coming up that wants to achieve meaning in that 
context and have an impact, and that may be a more efficient way to deal with society's 
problems than governments. (Levin, 2000, in Solomon 2000) 
In Levin’s assertion we see that mediation processes, particularly inter-generic instabilities, give 
us a window on social change, especially major institutional shifts in the locus of legitimate 
power. Nowhere is this clearer than in the vaudeville-cum-soap-opera of a globally 
entertainmentised politics on the one hand, and the sentiments expressed by Gerald Levin on the 
other.  
Crosscut: Media, genres, and modes; discourses, genres, and texts 
Media, genres, and modes are fundamental and interrelated aspects of meaning making 
processes, and there are many levels of redundancy across these analytical domains. The level 
of genre is where institutional ructions are first expressed because it is at the level of genre that 
we see the intersection of textual and discoursal categories with those of mediation (see Figure 
2). It is here, at the level of genre, that we can begin to make sense of how mediation processes 
affect axiological hybridities, including their relationship to modes, the most fundamental 
resources making meaning. 
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Figure 1: Intersection of discourses, genres, and texts with a mediation perspective. 
Figure 2 is meant to show that any number of discourses can be articulated through a 
given medium, and that specific texts draw on the entire pool of modal resources permitted by a 
given medium without ever exhausting the entire range of modal possibilities. Also, in this view, 
genre, as defined from “below” (i.e., as a textually constituted category), appears more as a 
text-type than a media form. Genre is seen to be constituted textually in a formal sense and 
constrained ideationally (from “above”) by discoursal boundaries.  
Medium 
Genres 
Discourses  
Texts 
Modes  
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The intersection between discoursal and medialogical perspectives on genre 
foregrounds the role of social function. That is to say, as we approach a text (regardless of its 
modal composition), moving “inwards” from the category of mediation, we begin to see what 
kinds of social “work” the text is part of. By moving “inwards” towards a text from the “longer” 
and more abstract categories of mediation, discourse, and genre, we can keep sight of the text’s 
history, its institutional inheritances, and, consequently, its axiological underpinnings. By 
maintaining a mediation perspective (which means merely that we approach the text firstly from 
this direction, from outside-in), we maintain a sense of the scale on which the text is produced 
and distributed, and the scale from which it draws coherence (Lemke, 2000). Once discourse 
and interdiscursive activity come into view, we begin to see the functional aspects of the text. At 
the level of interinstitutional activity, during which genres are hybridised (Fairclough, 2000), the 
first functional aspect of the text to come into focus is its axiological dimension.  
Reiteration and elaboration 
 The “critical” part of CDA and the “contextual” part of SFL are perhaps their most 
mutual and complementary aspects. Both emphasise the cultural and historical aspects of 
meaning. Both set out to comprehend meanings with reference to the coherence generating 
function of social context, history, and culture. Yet neither approach provides a sufficient 
account of how mediation impacts upon meaning systems, or, more importantly, of the role of 
mediation plays as the very means by which meanings are produced, preserved, moved, 
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distributed, and changed over time and across social boundaries. Mediation is a perspective, 
not merely a reference to technological systems (although the latter are important characteristics 
of any given system of mediations). It may well be that bureaucratic systems are the oldest and, 
as Max Weber claims, ‘the hardest to destroy’ of all media forms (1913/1991, p. 228). Yet 
even the day-to-day operations and axiological principles of any bureaucracy are dramatically 
changed with the introduction of new media forms, such as computer technologies or telephones 
(McLuhan, 1964).  
The inclusion of mediation adds a layer of analysis to CDA and SFL that is capable of 
seeing the technological means by which meanings are moved within and between cultures, often 
over very long periods of time, and how these constrain modal potentials. Modes, in turn, are 
the constituency elements for genre formation within any mediation system. At any point in time 
the media environment will have deep and sustained effects on what kinds of meanings can be 
made, by whom, under which circumstances, and to what effect.  
When a mediation perspective is overlaid with relations between discourse, genres, and 
texts established by CDA and SFL, we begin to see why texts and genres appear as, and have 
been widely understood as being, artefacts of meaning rather than as stages in wider networks 
of patterned social action, or action genres. Seen as activity formations, genres are revealed as 
dynamic sites of interinstitutional hybridities. Institutions are largely recognisable as such 
precisely because of the genres that constitute them. People do institutions, they produce and 
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reproduce them through recognisable patterns of action. A university has a suite of action 
genres, such as lectures, exams, and research processes, all of which are loaded with specific 
expectations that pertain and adhere to the university as a social institution. Similarly, the values 
of divinity adhere to sermons and other genres of religious ritual; the values of expertise, 
including accuracy and objectivity, adhere to scientific reports and other overtly technical forms, 
such as architects’ drawings, engineers’ schematics, and academic articles; the values of legality 
and justice adhere (ideally) to the institutions of law.  
Yet institutional axiologies change. They change through institutional hybridities. Certain 
classes of institutional action get hybridised with others and are subsequently revalued. In the 
examples I have used above, we have seen that the genres of power politics have significantly 
changed because of their situation within a wider media environment in which many people 
spend a lot of time: the environment of sitcoms, advertisements, action movies, docutainments, 
soap-operas, and advertorials. The movement of power politics into the domain of 
entertainment, and of the axiological shift that such a movement entails is self-conscious and 
uncontentious, even in Australia:  
Peter Beattie 2 was honest when he admitted in 2000 that, for better or for worse, being 
a media tart was part of the job of being a politician. It was a bit rich that his colleagues 
in opposition should make a song and dance about the fact that he admitted it, he said. 
“It's like two prostitutes standing on the corner talking about virginity.” (Baird, 2002) 
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Just as the axiologies of power politics have changed to accommodate new mediations, so have 
many others. To understand these changes, we need to look beyond the domain with which we 
are concerned to see the movement of one set of institutional axiologies into another, and the 
types of contradictory axiological results such moves inevitably entail. 
The presidential humorist, Katz, sees himself as having moved ‘from the principal’s 
office to the Oval Office’ via the fields of advertising, journalism, party politics, public relations, 
and academia. He participated in producing a very unstable but remarkable form of political 
communication: presidential sitcom. The transient form developed by Katz and his colleagues—
pre-generic because it never reached a recognisable or stable form (which would ruin its effect 
in any case)—is remarkable for the way it highlights the relationships among mediation, genre, 
discourse, and text, and for how it highlights the subtle ways in which the axiological “ground” 
must be prepared by one institution before being successfully coopted and occupied by other 
institutions which are rivals for power.  
Conclusion 
The existence of globally dispersed, fast-moving, fast-changing meaning systems is 
undoubtedly a function of new mediation processes, which include and depend upon new 
communication technologies and new institutional relations. The predominant role of this system, 
its effects felt at every level throughout humanity, makes mediation a central object for the 
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analysis of meaning. And while Clinton and Katz’s self-conscious foray into the world of sitcom 
may present dilemmas in assessing the role and place of power politics in the current 
environment, it provides an excellent example of the kinds of axiological contradictions that new 
mediations entail, and which we will continue to see as disparate social domains are brought into 
contact on a global scale by new, faster, more chaotic mediations. Approached from a 
mediation perspective, the first functional dimension of the strange and unfamiliar forms of 
meaning that will present itself is the axiological dimension, as overt reorderings of evaluative 
priorities become apparent. As it stands, post-September 11, 2001, the realm of power politics 
has shifted its axiological biases from the institutions of show business to the institutions of war. 
Terror and violence, not humour, have become the organising axiological standards for engaging 
with the axiologies of mass mediations. The instability of presidential levity could not last. It has, 
once again, given way to the “grand narrative” of good versus evil, a simple, definite, and, one 
might say, almost comfortable myth by dint of its seemingly eternal recurrence.  
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